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I.

INTRODUCTION

Contemporary debates surrounding unilateral intervention have rightly
centered on Article 51 of the UN Charter and its codification of the right
of self-defense. In the absence of a Security Council authorization or a
valid Article 51 argument, interventions are deemed illegal—an intolerable
situation that has triggered several ad hoc attempts to explain or justify
humanitarian intervention via new or invented exceptions to the Charter
scheme, including the much-heralded responsibility to protect doctrine.1
* Professor of Law, Cornell Law School.
1. For a good evaluation of these debates, see Saira Mohamed, Taking Stock of the
Responsibility to Protect, 48 STANFORD JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 63 (2012).
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This essay argues that a better solution resides within—not outside—
Article 51 itself. The solution depends on recognizing the great complexity
of Article 51, especially its explicit incorporation of natural law by reference
to the droit naturel to légitime défense.2 The effect of this incorporation was to
preserve and protect, as a carve-out from the prohibition against force
codified in Article 2 of the Charter, the rights of defensive force that
applied in natural law (and so continue to be protected by Article 51). This
is the doctrine of legitimate defense.
Part II explains in greater detail this dynamic incorporation of natural
law in Article 51, and, in particular, defends the conclusion that it
incorporates natural law into the Charter, thus making natural law
absolutely central to any theory of self-defense that is faithful to the
article’s text. Part III.A examines the proper scope of defensive rights
under natural law and concludes that defensive force included, in extreme
situations, a right of intervention in rogue States that refused to comply
with natural law in order to “perfect” the intervening State’s right of
preservation. Part III.B provides a normative foundation for the doctrine
of legitimate defense by showing how the right of self-determination, the
right to be free from genocide and the right to self-defense, all flow from a
more primary right that one might call the right to exist—a right that
attaches not just to formal States, but also to nations and peoples.
Although public international lawyers are often uncomfortable discussing
and relying upon the rights of nations, the universally recognized right of
self-determination and the right to be free from genocide logically entail
that non-State entities such as nations and peoples are legally protected by
existing international law (lex lata). Finally, Part III.C, drawing on an earlier
work published with George Fletcher, explains how a nation’s right to selfdefense can trigger a third party’s right to intervene on its behalf. The
textual basis for this claim is that self-defense and other-defense are
structurally united in the phrase droit naturel to légitime défense for two reasons.
First, natural law recognized a right of intervention against States that
violate international law. Second, légitime défense is a criminal law concept
that includes both self-defense and defense of others. Part IV explains the
implications of this novel analysis. This reading of Article 51 shows how its
explicit incorporation of natural law and its reference to legitimate defense
provides the conceptual grounding for a modern doctrine of humanitarian
intervention, especially once it is recognized that natural law protects
2. Charte des Nations Unis art. 51.
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nations and peoples in addition to formal states. More importantly, this
justification for humanitarian intervention is an interpretation of Article 51
and is therefore preferable to the responsibility to protect (RTP) or other
legal doctrines that operate as purported exceptions to the UN Charter and
thereby weaken its legitimacy. Finally, Part V applies the doctrine of
legitimate defense to two recent examples to show that it licenses just
enough force. It is submitted that the NATO intervention in Kosovo was a
lawful exercise of legitimate defense, consistent with Article 51, to protect
the ethnic Kosovars, but the Russian covert interventions in Crimea and
eastern Ukraine do not meet the standards contained in the doctrine.
II.

THE INCORPORATION OF NATURAL LAW IN ARTICLE 51

Public international lawyers are generally hostile to natural law. Even
though natural law has a rich and distinguished history as the moral and
legal foundation for natural rights, lawyers today get squeamish when the
doctrinal conversation turns to natural law.3 Bentham famously referred to
natural rights as “nonsense upon stilts”4 because he denied the existence of
any natural law that could provide the foundation for these rights. For
Bentham, the only rights that existed were the positive rights that
governments enacted in their laws. Although there were prudential reasons
for the government to make this determination, it could not be called a
“right” until the government placed the coercive power of the State behind
it and effectuated its promise. Of course, this positive conception of rights
runs head first into the rhetoric that activists and litigants use when they
talk of rights. In situations when governments deny the existence of the
right in question, litigants do not simply request that the government create
the right; they demand that the government recognize the right. Recognition
logically entails that the right is pre-existing, as the phrase “inalienable
right” in the American Declaration of Independence suggests. Even if the
government purports to take away the right, the right still exists. This idea

3. Of course this is not universally true. See W. Michael Reisman, The View from the
New Haven School of International Law, 86 AMERICAN SOCIETY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
PROCEEDINGS 118, 119 (1992) (“The New Haven School of jurisprudence is an entirely
secular theory of law but it takes the perspective long associated with natural law, that of
the decision maker.”).
4. Jeremy Bentham, Anarchial Fallacies, in NONSENSE UPON STILTS: BENTHAM, BURKE
AND MARX ON THE RIGHTS OF MAN 46, 53 (Jeremy Waldron ed., 1987).
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only makes sense if rights have some legitimacy and reality over and above
their positive enactment by government sources.
So the key tension here is between natural law and positivism.5
Although legal positivism has many different flavors and aspects, at least
one key element of the doctrine is that all law must be written and
attributable to a specific governmental entity with the authority to issue
such enactments.6 To find the law, in other words, one must examine a
piece of written text and identify the source of the text and its specific
authority to promulgate it.7 This is how one picks out pieces of law from
non-law in the universe. Although there may be other sources of normative
authority (e.g., moral or religious norms), the positivist decision-procedure
allows one to pick out the distinctively legal sources of normativity.8
Positivism (or at least one strain of it) runs deep among public
international lawyers, even though if looking from the outside one would
not expect legal positivism to gain much traction in international law.9
Why is public international law a surprising fit for legal positivism? 10
Because in addition to treaties and conventions as accepted sources of
international law, mainstream public international law also includes
customary law—a feature that is somewhat difficult to integrate into a
standard definition of legal positivism because customary law is, by
definition, unwritten in nature.11 That being said, while conceding that
customary international law is difficult (but not impossible) to integrate
into a general framework of legal positivism, mainstream public
5. See ANTHONY J. SEBOK, LEGAL POSITIVISM IN AMERICAN JURISPRUDENCE 228
(1998).
6. See ANTONY ANGHIE, IMPERIALISM, SOVEREIGN AND THE MAKING OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW 44 (2007); GODEFRIDUS J.H. HOOF, RETHINKING THE SOURCES
OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 36 (1983).
7. J.L. AUSTIN, THE PROVINCE OF JURISPRUDENCE DETERMINED (1954).
8. For a more sophisticated version of positivism than Austin, see Joseph Raz, Legal
Positivism and the Sources of Law, in THE AUTHORITY OF LAW: ESSAYS ON LAW AND
MORALITY 37 (Joseph Raz ed., 1983). See also MATTHEW H. KRAMER, IN DEFENSE OF
LEGAL POSITIVISM: LAW WITHOUT TRIMMINGS (1999).
9. See JEAN D’ASPREMONT, FORMALISM AND THE SOURCES OF INTERNATIONAL
LAW: A THEORY OF ASCERTAINMENT OF LEGAL RULES 25–27 (2011) (describing the
confusing nature of contemporary debates on legal positivism in international law as
“unfathomable and unintelligible”).
10. See Ingo Venzke, Post-modern Perspectives on Orthodox Positivism, in INTERNATIONAL
LEGAL POSITIVISM IN A POST-MODERN WORLD 182, 185 (Jörg Kammerhofer & Jean
d’Aspremont eds., 2014).
11. See DENNIS M. PATTERSON, LAW AND TRUTH 96 (1999).
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international law is largely weighted towards positivistic frames of
reference.12 By that I mean that international lawyers have a rigid definition
of what counts as international law, based on a theory of sources that is
famously expressed in Article 38 of the International Court of Justice (ICJ)
Statute.13 International law can be found in written treaties, decisions of
international tribunals, general principles of law emanating from national
legal systems (and therefore positive in nature) and customary international
law with its relatively clear definition of what counts as custom:
widespread, consistent, uniform and representative State practice,
combined with opinio juris.14 Although customary international law is not
written, it does emanate from a source—the world community of States—
that has the authority under international law to promulgate binding rules
of law through the process of establishing customary law.15 So it is
theoretically possible for a legal positivist to accept the legitimacy of
customary international law without abandoning legal positivism as a
jurisprudential commitment. In contrast, though, natural law does not
easily fit within that theory of sources and, consequently, international
lawyers often denigrate it as “mere morality” or “mere philosophy,” but
not something that should be dignified with the label “law.”16
Having explained the deep current of legal positivism that runs through
public international law, I now wish to question whether international law
(or any law) can be fully positivistic, by referring to the basic concept of
self-defense in both its international (jus ad bellum) and domestic (criminal
law) varieties.17 Self-defense is clearly codified in the domestic criminal law
12. For a discussion, see Jörg Kammerhofer, Uncertainty in the Formal Sources of
International Law: Customary International Law and Some of its Problems, 15 EUROPEAN
JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 523 (2004).
13. Statute of the International Court of Justice, June 26, 1945, 59 Stat. 1055, 33
U.N.T.S. 993.
14. See International Law Association, Final Report of the Committee on the
Formation of Customary (General) International Law, Statement of Principles Applicable to the
Formation of General Customary International Law, in REPORT OF THE SIXTY-NINTH
CONFERENCE 712 (2000).
15. Indeed, it is interesting to note that Justice Holmes’ description of the positivist
origins of the common law referred not just to sovereign sources but also quasi-sovereign
sources. See Southern Pacific Company v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 205, 222 (1917) (Holmes, J.,
dissenting).
16. For a discussion, see GIDEON BOAS, PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW:
CONTEMPORARY PRINCIPLES AND PERSPECTIVES 13 (2012).
17. On the natural law origins of self-defense, see John J. Merriam, Natural Law and
Self-Defense, 206 MILITARY LAW REVIEW 43 (2010).
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of every jurisdiction. Similarly, self-defense has always been allowed in
international law—and necessarily so.18 But imagine a State that decided to
abolish the justification of self-defense in its criminal law, i.e., a State
government that, on grounds of pure pacifism, declared that individuals
could not fight back against illegal and unjustified attacks, even those that
compromised the bodily integrity or life of the victim. I think it would be
safe to say that even in that situation, the defender would still have the right
to defend himself against the unlawful attack because that right cannot be
taken away from him.19 The domestic legal system is capable of doing a lot
of things, but taking away the fundamental right of self-defense is not one
of them.20 Similarly, if the domestic legal system were to codify brutality or
genocidal treatment, that positive enactment would be overridden by
natural law. But if that is the case, what is the source of that right?21 The
source is clearly not the positive enactment of the domestic jurisdiction’s
penal statute, since the positive law contains no such justification. Indeed,
the source of the right must pre-date the positive law; it must stand behind
it. It is, in other words, a principle of natural law that endures even if
positive law contradicts it.
Now, the legal positivist might object at this point that the pre-positive
rights are moral in nature. In other words, the legal positivist might concede
that it would be wrong for a domestic system to change its law in this
manner, but the nature of this conclusion would be moral—not legal. The
only thing that the positivist would deny would be the attachment of the
word “legal” to the underlying right at issue here. The positivist would say
that domestic legal systems that fail to recognize the right of self-defense
are violating the moral rights of the defenders, but not their legal rights.
The label “legal” is reserved for enactments from the duly authorized
agents of the government. Of course, the hypothetical debate between the
legal positivist and the natural lawyer depends in part on the resolution of

18. The natural law origins are discussed explicitly in DEREK W. BOWETT, SELFDEFENSE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 4 (1958).
19. See Merriam, supra note 17, at 58 (“Self-defense under natural law is unrestrictive
because, while it can be limited to some extent, it can never be taken away entirely; a law
that purports to eliminate the right to self-defense would be unjust.”).
20. Id.
21. For theorists such as Hobbes, the natural right of self-defense provided the
conceptual ground for many of the defensive rights that could be asserted in civil society.
See Claire Finkelstein, Hobbesian Reasoning and Wicked Laws, in HOBBES TODAY: INSIGHTS
FOR THE 21ST CENTURY 49, 58 (S.A. Lloyd ed., 2013).
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the famous Hart-Fuller debate.22 Hart believed that a particular law was
“law” as long as it was enacted according to a particular procedure (rule of
recognition) and followed as law (social practice), regardless of whether the
law was morally just.23 In contrast, Fuller allowed for some considerations
of moral justice to help determine whether a particular legal enactment
constituted a law.24 For example, Hart would have viewed Nazi laws as
immoral but law nonetheless, while Fuller would denied these enactments
the label “law” since they did not meet minimal standards of morality and
justice.25
While these are important jurisprudential debates, I want to argue in
this essay that the law of self-defense under international law is entirely
immune from the underlying impulse behind legal positivism. In other
words, even if one accepts the entirety of Hart’s legal positivism, and
rejects Fuller’s version of natural law, it would still be the case that the
structure of the international law of self-defense requires reference to
natural law. How can this be so?
The international law of self-defense is governed by Article 51, which
states that “Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right
of individual or collective self-defence if an armed attack occurs against a
Member of the United Nations, until the Security Council has taken
measures necessary to maintain international peace and security.”26 The key
words here are “inherent right;” the idea is that the right of self-defense is
inherent and pre-exists the positive law. Moreover, the equally authoritative
French language version of the Charter makes the reference to natural law
even more sharply: it refers to the “droit naturel de légitime défense.” Both
“inherent right” and “droit naturel” suggest an explicit reference to natural
law as defining the proper scope of self-defense.27
22. See Karen Knop, The Hart-Fuller Debate’s Silence on Human Rights, in THE HARTFULLER DEBATE IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 61 (Peter Cane ed., 2010).
23. See H.L.A. Hart, Positivism and the Separation of Law and Morals, 71 HARVARD LAW
REVIEW 593 (1958).
24. See Lon Fuller, Positivism and Fidelity to Law: A Reply to Professor Hart, 71 HARVARD
LAW REVIEW 630 (1958).
25. Id. at 633 (“Without any inquiry into the actual workings of whatever remained of
a legal system under the Nazis, Professor Hart assumes that something must have
persisted that still deserved the name of law in a sense that would make meaningful the
ideal of fidelity to law.”).
26. U.N. Charter art. 51.
27. For a full explanation of this argument, see GEORGE P. FLETCHER & JENS DAVID
OHLIN, DEFENDING HUMANITY: WHEN FORCE IS JUSTIFIED AND WHY (2008).
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How does this solve the problem of legal positivism? It solves it
because Article 51 is an example of written authoritative law that satisfies
whatever amount of legal positivism to which public international lawyers
are committed. It is a written expression of the law-making authority of the
States that negotiated, signed and ratified the UN Charter, consistent with
their authority to make binding international law in the form of a treaty.
Unless one is a legal positivist who denies the possibility of international
law and treaties entirely, the Charter is a valid form of written international
law. What is special about the Charter is that its Article 51 incorporates by
reference natural law in order to fix the proper contours of self-defense.28 It
could have established the content of its provision on self-defense in any
number of ways, but it did it by referring to natural law and incorporating
its content into the written provision on self-defense. So while Article 51
articulates the form of self-defense, its content comes from natural law
according to Article 51 itself. In a sense, natural law becomes positive law
once it is incorporated into the written provisions of the treaty, although to
fix the content of its exact source one needs to consult natural law as an
interpretative guide to what the provision means.
We can now turn directly to the question of the scope of self-defense
as defined by the Charter’s positive incorporation of natural law through its
reference in Article 51. State members of the United Nations are
prohibited from using force or the threat of force to solve international
disputes—a prohibition that is codified in Article 2(4).29 This prohibition is
generally assumed to now transcend its codification in the Charter; it is
both customary and jus cogens, and applies to non-member States as well.30
However, the prohibition against force is not universal, because Article 51
carves out cases of legitimate defense (légitime défense) from the scope of the
Article 2 prohibition.31 The point of the carve-out is to preserve and
exempt the natural law of legitimate defense from the general prohibition

28. The use of natural law to understand Article 51 is rare but not unprecedented in
contemporary scholarship. See, e.g., William Bradford, “The Duty to Defend Them”: A Natural
Law Justification for the Bush Doctrine of Preventive War, 79 NOTRE DAME LAW REVIEW 1365,
1430 (2004); Sean D. Magenis, Natural Law as the Customary International Law of Self-Defense,
20 BOSTON UNIVERSITY INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL 413, 414 (2002).
29. See IAN BROWNLIE, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE USE OF FORCE BY STATES 4
(1963).
30. See YORAM DINSTEIN, WAR, AGGRESSION, AND SELF-DEFENSE 105 (2011).
31. FLETCHER & OHLIN, supra note 27, at 65–72.
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on the use of force codified in Article 2.32 Indeed, Article 2 gestures
towards the Article 51 carve-out when it states that “[a]ll Members shall
refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against
the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any
other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations.” The
operative phrase here is “inconsistent with the purposes of the United
Nations.” Presumably, one purpose of the United Nations is to protect the
rights identified in the Charter, including the natural right of legitimate
defense. Article 51 then explicitly carves out the natural right of legitimate
defense in a way that is entirely consistent with the animating impulse
behind Article 2(4). More specifically, the United Nations is, among other
things, an organization dedicated both to international peace and collective
security, and the right of all member States to engage in legitimate
defense—unilaterally if necessary—is an essential element of the UN
Charter’s security regime. Indeed, had the Charter not carved out the
natural law of self-defense from the Article 2(4) prohibition on the use of
force, the result would have been a near-fatal defect in the burgeoning
relevance of this fragile international organization. Had the drafters
required that the Security Council be the exclusive authorization for the use
of force in all situations, the result would have been that States would have
exercised their natural right to legitimate defense anyway (rather than face
destruction), with the consequence that this hypothetical international
regime would have quickly collapsed as irrelevant and impotent.33
This analysis suggests two important facts that are sometimes
overlooked in more conventional analyses of the right to self-defense. First,
natural law is an essential component in any discussion of the right of selfdefense, because the Charter’s framers decided to anchor their definition of
self-defense using and incorporating the basic principles of natural law.
Nor was this a flight of fancy or an odd turn of phrase. It was, instead, a
perfectly sensible and indeed indispensable policy choice: it was a decision
to constrain the power of the Charter’s centralized force regime in such a
32. Other scholars have used the term “carve out” to understand Article 51; the idea
is not controversial. See, e.g., Matthew C. Waxman, Cyber-Attacks and the Use of Force: Back to
the Future of Article 2(4), 36 YALE JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 421, 427 (2011). See
also Albrecht Randelzhofer, Article 51, in 1 THE CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS: A
COMMENTARY 788, 796 (Bruno Simma ed., 2d ed. 2002).
33. Cf. CHRISTINE D. GRAY, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE USE OF FORCE 16 (3d
ed. 2008) (discussing primary but not exclusive authority of the Security Council on use of
force questions, according to the International Court of Justice).
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way as to preserve the discretion that natural law conveys upon all victims
of international aggression to resist their attackers. Had the drafters
overstepped and negated this natural right, the Charter might have been
ignored. Instead of negating this natural right, the framers preserved it.34
Second, none of this runs afoul of modern notions of legal positivism,
because natural law is not directly part of the law of self-defense; it is
indirectly part of self-defense through its textual incorporation in the
language of Article 51. By incorporating and preserving pre-Charter natural
law, the natural right of self-defense became quasi-textual. However, in
order to interpret the scope of the textual right, one needs to understand
natural law. Although this conclusion might be uncomfortable for modern
positivist international lawyers who dislike natural law, a careful attention
and fidelity to the treaty’s text requires it.
III. THE PROPER SCOPE OF LEGITIMATE DEFENSE UNDER NATURAL LAW
The next task is to excavate the appropriate scope of legitimate defense
under natural law—and by extension Article 51. In the following section, I
argue that the natural law concept of legitimate defense is much broader
than conventional notions of self-defense. Consequently, this section
outlines a normative conception of legitimate defense based on the notion
of self-preservation (including the right of existence) and shows how this
natural law right is holistically linked to present-day doctrines of selfdefense, the prevention of genocide and self-determination.
A. Natural Law and Self-Preservation
Natural law theorists writing in the nineteenth century often discussed selfdefense under the rubric of “self-preservation” and the “necessity of self-

34. KINGA TIBORI SZABO, ANTICIPATORY ACTION IN SELF-DEFENCE: ESSENCE
LIMITS UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW 30 (2011) (“the natural law concept of selfdefense was enshrined in the United Nations Charter”). But see David Kretzmer, The
Inherent Right to Self-Defence and Proportionality in Jus Ad Bellum, 24 EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW 235 (2013); Sean Murphy, The Doctrine of Preemptive Self-Defense, 50
VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW 699, 713–14 (2005); William K. Lietzau, Old Laws, New Wars:
Jus ad Bellum in an Age of Terrorism, 8 MAX PLANCK YEARBOOK OF UNITED NATIONS
LAW 383, 388 (2004).
AND
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preservation.”35 This provided the normative ground for the use of military
force to repel an unjust attack. The basic idea was that countries have a
right to self-preservation and an outside attack that threatens their
existence will require them—out of necessity—to use military force to
preserve their existence.36 For ease of locution I refer to this as the “right
to exist,” which although not described in this language by natural law
theorists of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, does nonetheless
capture the essence of self-preservation that grounded their conception of
self-defense. Given the fundamental nature of the right to selfpreservation, the right was not subject to rescission by positive law. It is
indelible and inalienable. Its source was—and remains—natural law.
For example, Christian Wolff characteristically argued that “man is
bound to preserve himself by nature” and that “likewise the right of
defending one’s self again the injuries of others belongs to man by nature,
and the law of nature itself assigns it to a nation.”37 Similarly, Vattel argued
that all States, just like all individuals, have the right to preserve themselves
under natural law:
The right of employing force, or making war, belongs to nations no
farther than is necessary for their own defence, and for the maintenance
of their rights. Now, if any one attacks a nation, or violates her perfect
rights, he does her an injury. Then, and not till then, that nation has a
right to repel the aggressor, and reduce him to reason. Further, she has a
right to prevent the intended injury, when she sees herself threatened
with it.38

35. Fenwick concludes that the term “self-preservation” fell out of favor around
1920. See C.G. Fenwick, Book Review, 41 HARVARD LAW REVIEW 936 (1928) (reviewing
BRUCE WILLIAMS, STATE SECURITY AND THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS (1927)).
36. See Roman Boed, State of Necessity as a Justification for Internationally Wrongful Conduct,
3 YALE HUMAN RIGHTS AND DEVELOPMENT LAW JOURNAL 1, 4 (2000) (“Necessity, it
seems, was from long ago coupled with the notion of self-preservation. That is to say,
when a threat to self-preservation arose, it was considered justified to take any steps
necessary to preserve one's existence, even if such steps would have been unlawful had
they been taken in the absence of a threat to self-preservation.”).
37. See CHRISTIAN WOLFF, JUS GENTIUM METHODO SCIENTIFICA PERTRACTATUM §
3, at 9–10 (Joseph H. Drake trans., Oxford University Press 1934) (1764).
38. See EMMERICH DE VATTEL, THE LAW OF NATIONS; OR PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW
OF NATURE, APPLIED TO THE CONDUCT AND AFFAIRS OF NATIONS AND SOVEREIGNS
ch. III § 26, at 301 (Joseph Chitty ed., T. & J. W. Johnson, Law Booksellers 1844) (1758).
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Wheaton held a similar view and explicitly referred to the right of selfdefense as the right of self-preservation: “Of the absolute international
rights of States, one of the most essential and important, and that which
lies at the foundation of all the rest, is the right of self preservation.”39 This
includes subsidiary rights of which the most important is the notion of selfdefense. As Wheaton explained,
“[i]n the exercise of these means of defence, no independent State can be
restricted by any foreign power. But another nation may, by virtue of its
won right of self-preservation, if it sees in these preparations an occasion
for alarm, or if it anticipates any possible danger of aggression, demand
explanations . . . .40

Indeed, the right of self-preservation was so central to the natural law
conception of self-defense that natural law theorists regarded it not simply
as a right but also a duty. Wheaton recognized this when he wrote that selfpreservation “is not only a right with respect to other States, but a duty
with respect to its own members, and the most solemn and important
which the State owes to them.”41 It might sound odd to think of selfpreservation as not only a right but also a duty, but, in fact, this
conceptualization was common under natural law and essential to
understanding its broader impact with regard to the doctrine of military
intervention. Nor was Wheaton alone in using the language of duty to refer
to self-preservation. For example, Wolff referred to self-preservation not
only as a right but also a duty because “every nation is bound to preserve
itself.”42 This includes “averting the danger of destruction.”43 Specifically,
Wolff concluded that “[t]he right belongs to every nation to defend itself
and its right against another nation. For the right belongs to everybody.
Therefore, since the same right is to be applied to nations also, the right
belongs to every nation also to defend itself against another nation.”44
In these comments one can see how the duty to preserve oneself is
intimately linked to the duty to ensure the perfection of other States as well.
This notion goes back at least as far back as Vattel, who concluded that “a
39. See HENRY WHEATON, ELEMENTS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW pt. II, ch. I, at 86
(6th ed. 1855).
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. WOLFF, supra note 37, § 273, at 139.
43. Id.
44 Id.
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nation must not simply confine itself to preserving itself but must also
pledge itself to the preservation (and perfection) of other nations as well.” 45
This suggests that the silo of sovereignty, which so often animates current
international law thinking, was weaker under the natural law theorists. As a
result, self-preservation in its broadest sense included not just repelling an
outside attack, but also pro-actively intervening externally in foreign States
whose behavior was inconsistent with basic principles of natural law. For
example, Hall argued that “intervention” in foreign States was justified on
grounds of “self-preservation.”46 This shows that the current dichotomy
between self-defense and foreign intervention was not present, at least not
in its current starkness, in the natural law realm. Indeed, Hall wrote
specifically that “interventions for the purpose of self-preservation
naturally include all those which are grounded upon danger to the
institutions, to the good order, or to the external safety of the intervening
state.”47 Intervention was consistently defended by natural lawyers.48
45. VATTEL, supra note 38, at 136.
46. See WILLIAM E. HALL, A TREATISE ON INTERNATIONAL LAW ch. VII (1880).
47. Id., § 91, at 242. Also, Hall includes a lengthy discussion of intervention during a
civil war at the behest of one party to the conflict: “It is generally said, and the statement is
of course open to no question, that intervention may take place at the invitation of both
parties to a civil war.” See id., pt. II, ch. VIII, § 94, at 249.
48. See, e.g., 2 HUGO GROTIUS, ON THE LAW OF WAR AND PEACE ch. CCV, pt.
VIII(1) (A.C. Campbell trans., 1901) (1625) (concluding that governments lose “the rights
of independent sovereigns,” their right to be free from outside interference, and the
“privilege of the law of nations” when they “provoke their people to despair and
resistance by unheard of cruelties”); VATTEL, supra note 38, ch. IV, § 54 (permitting
intervention in support of oppressed populations); SAMUEL PUFFENDORF, DE JURE
NATURAE ET GENTIUM LIBRI OCTO bk. VIII, ch. 6, § 14 (C.H. Oldfather & W.A.
Oldfather trans., 1934) (1688). In a series of important articles, Evan Criddle (alone and
collaborating with Evan Fox-Decent) has shown that this fiduciary relationship is not just
a relic of the natural law past but is, rather, a foundational concept for today’s
international legal order. See especially Evan J. Criddle & Evan Fox-Decent, A Fiduciary
Theory of Jus Cogens, 34 YALE JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 331, 334 (2009)
(discussing the fiduciary model of State sovereignty and concluding that “[e]ven after
natural law theory fell into disrepute in the nineteenth century with the rise of legal
positivism, the classical notion of peremptory law continued to influence international
legal theory well into the modern era”); Evan J. Cirddle, Standing for Human Rights Abroad,
100 CORNELL LAW REVIEW 269, 302 (2015) (discussing the “parent-child” analogy in
Grotius to ground a general theory of countermeasures in contemporary international
law); Evan Fox-Decent & Evan J. Criddle, The Fiduciary Constitution of Human Rights, 15
LEGAL THEORY 301 (2009) (describing the State-subject relationship regulated by human
rights law as a “fiduciary relationship”).
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One might argue that although natural law recognized a broad right of
external intervention under the rubric of self-preservation and the duty to
perfect that right in other States, this basic scheme was upended by the
adoption of the UN Charter with its duty to refrain from using force under
Article 2 and its very limited right of self-defense codified in Article 51.
Some scholars act as if this transformation occurred almost
instantaneously, a veritable “Grotian moment” where the legal norms
quickly solidified.49 If this transformation happened rapidly, one could
point as its inspiration to the horrors of World War II, the dangers of
aggressive war (by Germany and Japan) and the need to avoid a repeat of
this scarring international experience.
But there is little evidence of such a Grotian moment. Indeed, the
broader natural law right of intervention was still very much in evidence in
the early days after the adoption of the UN Charter when the horrors of
World War II were still fresh in memory. For example, Hersch
Lauterpacht’s seventh edition of Oppenheim’s International Law, published in
1948, still couches the right of intervention in the form of selfpreservation: “From the earliest time of the existence of the Law of
Nations self-preservation was considered sufficient justification for many
acts of a State which violate other States.”50 Lauterpacht also argued that
“[o]nly such acts of violence in the interest of self-preservation are excused
as are necessary in self-defence, because otherwise the acting State would
have to suffer, or have to continue to suffer, a violation against itself.”51
The discussion of “self-preservation” is not simply a holdover from
Oppenheim’s earlier editions that Lauterpacht did not revisit. In fact,
Lauterpact specifically announced in the preface to the seventh edition that
the treatise was revised after the adoption of the UN Charter and that its
content takes into account these developments since “[t]here would be no
justification for neglecting, in a treatise of this kind, an account of these

49. Cf. DAN KUWALI, THE RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT: IMPLEMENTATION OF
ARTICLE 4(H) INTERVENTION 58 (2010) (referring without necessarily endorsing the view
that “[w]ith this proscription in the UN Charter under Article 2(4), the custom of
‘humanitarian intervention,’ if it could still be considered a valid practice, was now
abrogated”). The term “Grotian moment” comes from Falk. See Richard A. Falk, The
Grotian Moment: Unfulfilled Promise, Harmless Fantasy, Missed Opportunity? 13 INTERNATIONAL
INSIGHTS 3 (1997).
50. See 1 LASSA OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAW: A TREATISE ch. V, § 129
(Hersch Lauterpacht, 7th ed. 1948).
51. Id., § 130, at 266.
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developments.”52 In the text of the treatise, Lauterpacht explains how the
right of self-preservation is connected with the carve-out of in Article 51:
“Thus the Charter of the United Nations leaves intact the inherent right of
individual or collective self-defence in case of armed attack against a
member of the United Nations until the Security Council takes action.”53
Is this notion consistent with military intervention? Yes, Lauterpacht
recognized that it could be consistent with the right of self-preservation.
The treatise notes seven reasons for intervention, including: “If a State in
time of peace or war violate such rules of the Law of Nations as are
universally recognized by custom or are laid down in law-making treaties,
other States have a right to intervene and to make the delinquent submit to
the rules concerned.”54 His views in this regard are evidence that the
natural law origins of self-defense, under the broader notion of selfpreservation, endured well into the era of the UN Charter.
This broader notion of self-preservation, which Lauterpacht argued
was consistent with Article 51, connects the natural law notion of selfpreservation with modern doctrines of intervention. To summarize the
argument, the Charter by its explicit terms preserves the natural law right
of self-defense. Under natural law, self-defense was conceptualized in
terms of self-preservation, not only as a right but also as a duty. The duty
extended not just to preserving one’s own existence, but also perfecting that
right both for oneself and others. This provided for the right of
intervention against States acting contrary to international legal norms. In
short, natural law included an implicit doctrine of intervention for the
benefit of third parties that was subsumed under the doctrine of selfpreservation. This fact was not lost on Lauterpacht who also argued that
intervention “is generally directed only against a party within the state, or
against a particular form of state life, and it is frequently carried out in the
interest of the government or of persons belonging to the invaded state.”55
In other words, it was understood even in the emerging United Nations era
that intervention on behalf of a foreign party was part of the doctrine of
self-preservation. And it is that right which was preserved by Article 51 and
its carve-out from the Article 2 prohibition on the use of force.
Impoverished interpretations of Article 51 that ignore its natural law
origins produce an erroneously narrow view of defensive force. Moreover,
52. Id. at v (preface to the seventh edition).
53. Id., § 130, at 267.
54. Id., § 135, at 276.
55. Id., ch. VIII, § 88, at 240.
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this ignorance of natural law is unjustified even on textualist and positivist
grounds, since Article 51 by its bare terms incorporates by reference the
right as it existed under natural law.
As a conceptual matter, one might argue that the right of legitimate
defense belongs to nations instead of States. Since the right of legitimate
defense emanates from natural law, and States qua States are creatures of
positive law, then there must be some notion of legitimate defense that
existed even if there was no international system to confer recognition on
States. Think of the point this way: even if the world collapsed into pure
anarchy, the right of self-defense would still exist since it is a creature of
natural law. Even in the absence of formal State recognition, the right
would attach to some other more primary unit of analysis, such as nations
and peoples. This would entail a right of intervention on behalf of nations
and peoples (including oppressed minorities) seeking to exercise their rights
of self-preservation.
However, the natural law theorists would not have expressed the right
of intervention using the language of nations and peoples. Although they
recognized the distinction between nations and States,56 their doctrine of
intervention was based on a broad reading of self-preservation and the duty
to perfect that right as it attached to other States. They were not likely to use
the language of “nation” and “people” to describe the entities on whose
behalf intervention was permitted. They were more likely to simply assert
that the intervening State was perfecting the right of the target State (even
if that intervention was contrary to the wishes of the established
government of the target State). With that being said, as a normative matter
the concept of nations and peoples offers a more conceptually satisfying
rubric with which to express the natural law right of intervention. In the
following section, I explain how contemporary international law already
implicitly recognizes the right of nations and peoples to exist, and,
therefore, the broad reading of the natural law of self-preservation is
entirely consistent with the current trajectory of positive international
law—which offers substantial protection to these entities.

56. Wheaton understood that States and nations were separate. See WHEATON, supra
note 39, at 27 (“A State is also distinguishable from a Nation, since the former may be
composed of different races of men, all subject to the same supreme authority. Thus the
Austrian, Prussian and Ottoman empires, are each composed of a variety of nations and
people.”).
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B. Conceptual Foundations of Legitimate Defense
The right to exist provides the normative foundation for other rights in
international law that are often thought of as separate and conceptually
distinct from self-defense, such as protection from genocide and selfdetermination. But if one scrutinizes these concepts, it becomes clear that
the latter two are both positive expressions of—and vindications of—the
natural law concept of self-preservation and the right to exist.
The most obvious example here is genocide, which involves the right
of protected groups to be free from existential threat. The underlying
impulse of the law of genocide is that the group itself is deserving of
protection, not just the underlying individuals who make up the group.
Although this point is often confused, the underlying predicate offenses in
the Genocide Convention (as well as the relevant statutes of the ad hoc
tribunals) include predicate offenses that do not involve the killing of the
group members.57 These predicate offenses include forcibly transferring
children from one group to another, imposing measures intended to
prevent births and deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life
calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part. These
elements target the destruction of the group itself—as opposed to the
human beings who make up the group—and declare them illegal.58 The law
of genocide is based on the idea that some groups are deserving of
protection and that an attack against their existence is a fundamental
breach of international law.
As for which groups are protected by the law of genocide, the
Convention protects national, ethnical, racial and religious groups. There
has been some discussion of whether the list is under-inclusive and
whether political groups should be included.59 That discussion is important,
but not one that needs to be resolved here. The important point is that
national groups—not just States—are protected by the law of genocide.
Even if a group does not constitute a formal State, its right to exist is
preserved by the law of genocide and an existential attack against it

57. Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide art. 2,
Dec. 9, 1948, 102 Stat. 3045, 78 U.N.T.S. 277.
58. See WILLIAM SCHABAS, GENOCIDE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW: THE CRIME OF
CRIMES 236 (2000). See also LARRY MAY, GENOCIDE: A NORMATIVE ACCOUNT 65 (2010).
59. See DAVID L. NERSESSIAN, GENOCIDE AND POLITICAL GROUPS 177 (2010).
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constitutes a jus cogens violation.60 The lesson to be drawn from this fact is
that the right to exist under natural law is not limited to formal States, it
also includes—at the very least—State-like entities such as nations that do
not have formal recognition under positive international law. Their inability
to be recognized under international law does not prevent them from being
protected by the law of genocide—a positive law outgrowth of the
underlying natural right to self-preservation.
It should be obvious by now why the law of genocide is linked to the
natural law right to exist. Although the Genocide Convention was not
drafted until 1948, and the term genocide did not exist until Raphael
Lemkin coined the term in 1944,61 the idea that a national group is free
from existential attack is now hardwired into our thinking. Indeed, consider
what the state of the law would be if the Genocide Convention was
repealed and enough State parties signed a treaty declaring that genocide
was permissible. The result of such a declaration would be nugatory. One
way of expressing the point is that the prohibition against genocide is jus
cogens and non-derogable, regardless of what the Genocide Convention
says.62 But the question is why it is jus cogens and why the international
community is not in a position to permit existential attacks against national
groups. The only coherent answer is that the prohibition against genocide
is linked to a more fundamental right—the right to exist—that supervenes
over treaty-based law. It comes from natural law.
Under natural law, the right to exist should be attributed to nations and
peoples—not to States. There are two major pieces of evidence for this
proposition. The first is that the right to be free from genocidal attack is
not attributed to States, but rather to national and ethnic groups regardless
of whether they form a State or not. Indeed, most of the urgent cases of
genocide in the past century have involved cultural or national groups that
did not have their own State (e.g., Tutsis who shared a State with Hutus,
and Jews who lived in Germany and the rest of Europe prior to the
creation of Israel). Indeed, the ethnic violence in the Balkans involved
national groups inside Bosnia and Kosovo; the groups that are protected by

60. See CAROLINE FOURNET, THE CRIME OF DESTRUCTION AND THE LAW OF
GENOCIDE 99 (2013).
61. RAPHAEL LEMKIN, AXIS RULE IN OCCUPIED EUROPE (1944).
62. For a discussion of the jus cogens nature of genocide, see Application of the Convention
on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosn. & Herz. v. Yugo. (Serbia &
Montenegro), 1993 I.C.J. 325, 441 (Sept. 13) (separate opinion of Lauterpacht, J. ad hoc).
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the law of genocide are untethered from a formalistic conception of States
as the exclusive units of international law.
The second piece of evidence is the right of self-determination. This
right, even under positive international law, is attributed to nations and
peoples.63 It cannot be attributed simply to States otherwise it would be
utterly vacuous. The concept of self-determination does not simply
preserve the right of States to exist as States, which would only preserve
the status quo and nothing else. Rather, the right of self-determination is
the right of a nation or a people to exercise meaningful self-determination
in the form of self-government.64 In some cases that right takes the form of
internal self-determination (through meaningful participation in a larger
political unit) or external self-determination (through the creation of a
separate and new State specifically designed to vindicate the right of selfdetermination). There are important debates in the literature over when
negative conditions trigger external self-determination and a right to
remedial secession; for the moment those debates can be set aside. The
important point is that the right of self-determination is not a right that
belongs to States exclusively—it belongs to nations and peoples.
We now have explored two rights under international law that are
afforded to national groups: the right to be free from genocide and the
right to self-determination. In a sense, this should not be surprising,
because the underlying natural law right, the right to exist, belongs to
national groups regardless of whether or not they are recognized as formal
States under our system of international law. I now want to extend the
analysis one step further and suggest that the right of legitimate defense,
since it is an expression of this deeper right to self-preservation under
natural law, also belongs to national groups that do not constitute a State.
For some positivist international lawyers, this step in the argument
might go one step too far; but the argument is sound. Remember, the
structure of the UN Charter provides for a prohibition against the use of
force against member States, which is extended by custom and jus cogens to
all States. Article 51 then carves out from that prohibition the natural law
right of legitimate defense, which is preserved in spite of the Article 2
prohibition on the use of force. Since the content of that right is provided
63. See ANTONIO CASSESE, SELF-DETERMINATION OF PEOPLES: A LEGAL
APPRAISAL (1998).
64. Cf. Per Sevastik, Secession, Self-determination of “Peoples” and Recognition—The Case of
Kosovo’s Declaration of Independence and International Law, in LAW AT WAR: THE LAW AS IT WAS
AND THE LAW AS IT SHOULD BE 231, 235 (Ola Engdahl & Pal Wrange eds., 2008).
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by natural law, if natural law preserves the right of national groups to
protect themselves, then this right is preserved by Article 51. Furthermore,
there is nothing in Article 2 that—by its terms—applies the prohibition
against the use of force to national groups anyway. It is States that are
prohibited from using force. But even if the Article 2 prohibition applies to
national groups that remain stateless, the Article 51 carve-out preserves
those rights that they have under natural law.
C. Legitimate Defense and Article 51
Now comes time to outline the exact contours of the right of legitimate
defense under Article 51. This requires careful attention not just to natural
law, but also to the bare text of Article 51, which is often overlooked. The
English language version of the Charter refers to the inherent right of selfdefense, individual or collective. In addition, the French language version
of the Charter refers to the “droit naturel de légitime défense.”65 The phrase
légitime défense refers to the continental notion of legitimate defense that one
finds in the criminal law of jurisdictions such as France,66 Germany or
Spain, as well as the legal systems that draw their inspiration from them. 67
American and British common law jurisdictions often have one penal law
provision for self-defense, one for defense of others and possibly a third

65. The phrase legitimate defense also appears in the Spanish language version of the
UN Charter. See Carta de les Naciones Unidas art. 51 (“legitima defensa, individual o collectiva”).
66. French criminal law provides that “[n]’est pas pénalement responsable la personne
qui, devant une atteinte injustifiée envers elle-même ou autrui, accomplit, dans le même
temps, un acte commandé par la nécessité de la légitime défense d'elle-même ou d'autrui,
sauf s'il y a disproportion entre les moyens de défense employés et la gravité de l'atteinte.”
See CODE PÉNAL [C. PÉN.] art. 122-5.
67. For example, Swiss criminal law is influenced by German criminal law. Section 15
of the Swiss criminal code is titled “legitimate defense” and states that “[i]f any person is
unlawfully attacked or threatened with imminent attack, the person attacked and any other
person are entitled to ward off the attack by means that are reasonable in the
circumstances.” See SCHWEIZERISCHES STRAFGESETZBUCH [STGB], CODE PÉNAL SUISSE
[CP], CODICE PENALE SVIZZERO [CP] [CRIMINAL CODE] Dec. 21, 1937, SR 311.0, art. 15
(unofficial English government translation available at http://www.admin.ch/
ch/e/rs/3/311.0.en.pdf). In German, the provision is titled “Rechtfertigende Notwehr”
and states that “[w]ird jemand ohne Recht angegriffen oder unmittelbar mit einem Angriff
bedroht, so ist der Angegriffene und jeder andere berechtigt, den Angriff in einer den
Umständen angemessenen Weise abzuwehren.”
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for defense of property.68 In contrast, civil law jurisdictions, using an
economy of words, simply roll up everything into one notion of legitimate
defense which allows any individual to use appropriate and necessary force
to repel an unlawful attack against himself or a third party (what a common
law lawyer would refer to as defense of others). Of course, the defensive
force must be necessary in order to repel the attack and it must not be
disproportionate. For this reason, the German Penal Code uses the term
Notwehr, or necessary defense.69 In general, the concept of legitimate
defense rolls together self-defense and defense of others under a broader
notion of legitimate defense.
It is striking that the French and Spanish versions of the UN Charter
use this broader locution to express the defensive force concept in Article
51. Was this a deliberate choice on the part of the drafters to codify both
self-defense and defense of others within the same provision of Article 51?
Many lawyers will be tempted to argue that the drafting process and
negotiations were inevitably conducted in English, with translations that
were developed at the final stage of the process. This argument would
suggest that the English language version, through technically co-equal in
weight with the other official language versions, should receive priority as a
hermeneutical manner because of its status as a lingua franca. Although this
is a plausible argument, it assumes that the different negotiators were fully
aware that each State party involved in the drafting process was working
with a unified and coherent set of legal concepts—the English language
ones—and that they came to an agreement using the underlying common
law concepts. Rather, it is much more likely that Article 51 was
incompletely theorized, i.e., that it was designed to preserve the inherent
right of self-defense in the absence of Security Council authorization, with
68. See, e.g., Model Penal Code § 3.04 (self), § 3.05 (others), § 3.06 (property), § 3.07
(law enforcement) (1962).
69. See STRAFGESETZBUCH (STGB) [PENAL CODE], May 15, 1871
REICHSGESETZBLATT [RGBL.] 583, § 32 (“Notwehr: (1) Wer eine Tat begeht, die durch
Notwehr geboten ist, handelt nicht rechtswidrig. (2) Notwehr ist die Verteidigung, die
erforderlich ist, um einen gegenwärtigen rechtswidrigen Angriff von sich oder einem
anderen abzuwenden.”). In English, the provision provides that “(1) A person who
commits an act of necessary defense does not act unlawfully. (2) Necessary defense means
any defensive action that is necessary to avert an imminent unlawful attack on oneself or
another.” One could also translate Notwehr as “legitimate defense.” The advantage of the
phrase “necessary defense” is that it explains and evokes the historical and conceptual
relationship between justifications appealing to defensive force and defenses based on the
principle of necessity.
139

The Doctrine of Legitmate Defense

Vol. 91

little to no common agreement about when and how that right would be
applied.70 That was a retained ambiguity necessary for the agreement to be
completed. And this ambiguity was magnified by the fact that different
State parties came from different legal cultures in which the concept of
defensive force is carved up in fundamentally different ways. In some
jurisdictions, defense of others is part of legitimate defense, rather than
separate from it. Nothing in the language of Article 51 excludes this
interpretation.71
This is the major doctrinal payoff of recognizing the broader natural
law genesis of Article 51: it provides an argument in favor of outside
intervention in much the same way as responsibility to protect does.
However, the legitimate defense doctrine does not provide an omnibus
argument in favor of intervention in any situation when the results would
be otherwise disastrous. The argument allows for intervention in only a few
select situations based on the outer contours of the concept itself.
IV.

LEGITIMATE DEFENSE AND HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION

In the present Part, I first outline the criteria for exercising legitimate
defense and show how the doctrine can provide a legal foundation for
humanitarian intervention in select cases. Also, I argue that humanitarian
intervention as justified by the doctrine of legitimate defense is preferable
to the doctrine of responsibility to protect, the other leading contender for
providing a legal foundation for humanitarian intervention.
The doctrine of legitimate defense provides a foundation for
humanitarian intervention because it carves out from the Article 2
prohibition on the use of force not only self-defense, but also defense of
others, which also falls under the rubric of legitimate defense. Drawing on
principles of self-defense articulated in criminal law, the criteria for defense
of others maps on exactly to the criteria for self-defense. As the natural law
publicists clearly articulated, natural law protected the right of each
individual human being to exercise force on his or her behalf, and this
same principle applied in natural law to the exercise of force between
70. For a discussion of the negotiations, see RUTH B. RUSSELL, A HISTORY OF THE
UNITED NATIONS CHARTER 698–99 (1958).
71. Cf. Josef Kunz, Individual and Collective Self-Defense in Article 51 of the Charter of the
United Nations, 41 AMERICAN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 872, 875 (1947)
(discussing continental notions of defensive force from domestic criminal law during
analysis of defensive force under public international law).
140

International Law Studies

2015

collective groups. If an individual victim of an aggressor is entitled to use
force in the exercise of his or her self-defense, other individuals are entitled
to use force on their behalf as well. Indeed, it would be incoherent under
criminal law to assert that an individual victim of aggression is entitled to
use defensive force, but then deny that third parties may use force while
coming to their defense.72 This is the whole point of referring to defensive
force as a justification as opposed to an excuse.73 Since justifications are
general in nature and negate the wrongfulness of the act, it stands to reason
that the justified actor engaging in defensive force has performed no
wrongful action in defending himself. If the action itself is not wrongful,
then third parties are entitled—by logical extension—to come to the aid of
the original victim.74 In this way, justifications always flow down to third
parties, who by definition receive the benefits of the original actor’s
justification. Excuses, by contrast, do not flow down to third parties.75
Since the basic structure of the natural right of legitimate defense stems
from criminal law (it was developed by analogy in international law based on
its original application in criminal law),76 the same analysis applies to
legitimate defense as exercised by nations. Consequently, a group’s right to
use defensive force on its behalf corresponds exactly with the right of third
parties to exercise force on their behalf as well.
At this point, the doctrinal consequences of the argument are noncontroversial. No one seriously doubts that States can come to the aid of
third-party States that are attacked.77 The more controversial question is
whether the concept of defense of others that is implicitly contained within
legitimate defense can ground a doctrine of humanitarian intervention.78 I
argue here that it can because the right belongs to national groups
72. See Marcia Baron, Gender Issues in Criminal Law, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF
PHILOSOPHY OF CRIMINAL LAW 335, 355 (John Deigh & David Dolinko eds., 2011).
73. See GEORGE P. FLETCHER, RETHINKING CRIMINAL LAW (Oxford reprint 2010)
(1978).
74. But see Kent Greenawalt, The Perplexing Borders of Justification and Excuse, 84
COLUMBIA LAW REVIEW 1897 (1984).
75. GEORGE P. FLETCHER, BASIC CONCEPTS OF CRIMINAL LAW 143 (1998).
76. For an older discussion of international law that made frequent reference to
criminal law categories, see BOWETT, supra note 18, at 65.
77. See David K. Linnan, Self-Defense, Necessity, and U.N. Collective Security: United States
and Other Views, 1 DUKE JOURNAL OF COMPARATIVE & INTERNATIONAL LAW 57 (1991).
78. For a general discussion of the legality of humanitarian intervention, see SEAN D.
MURPHY, HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION: THE UNITED NATIONS IN AN EVOLVING
WORLD ORDER (1996).
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regardless of whether or not the national group constitutes a State. In other
words, if a national group located within a sovereign State is attacked, and
that attack threatens their natural law right to exist, the national group has a
right, sounding in natural law, to resist that unjustified attack. By extension,
other nations have the right to come to the assistance of that national
group through the exercise of the defense of others that is implicit in the
doctrine of legitimate defense. And it is precisely this broader natural law
right that is carved out of the prohibition against the use of force by Article
51. Other nations can intervene, even over the objection of the host State,
because natural law protects the right of national groups to exercise selfpreservation. This generates a right of unilateral intervention that falls
under the rubric of the Article 51 carve-out from the prohibition against
the use of force.
Some will object at this point that there is insufficient evidence that this
right of legitimate defense should be attributed to nations or peoples.
Lawyers working within a Westphalian framework of international law will
insist that the right of self-defense is afforded to existing States only and
that non-States, even groups that are best described as nations or peoples,
have no rights of defense protected by the UN Charter.79 This view is
doctrinaire and mainstream, but it is wrong. There are several reasons why.
First, if self-defense only applies to States, then it would be an outlier, since
the other international rights which are most closely connected to it—the
right to self-determination and the right to be free from genocide—apply
to national groups, not just States. So in that respect, reserving the concept
of self-defense to States would be an anachronism. Second, States are
creatures of positive law, of the legal doctrines that structure the
relationship of State recognition. Nations are not exactly natural kinds in
nature,80 but they are entities that exist regardless of whether positive law
recognizes their political and social organizations as legal persons under the
79. For an example of strict interpretation of the right to self-defense, see the
discussion in Thomas M. Franck, Terrorism and the Right of Self-Defense, 95 AMERICAN
JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 839 (2001) (discussing limits on the right of selfdefense and the conclusion of European public international lawyers that the U.S. use of
force against the Taliban after 9/11 was illegal).
80. See ERNEST GELLNER, NATIONS AND NATIONALISM 47 (2008) (“Nations are not
inscribed into the nature of things, they do no constitute a political version of the doctrine
of natural kinds. Nor were national states the manifest ultimate destiny of ethnic or
cultural groups. What do exist are cultures, often subtly grouped, shading into each other,
overlapping, intertwined; and there exist, usually but not always, political units of all
shapes and sizes.”).
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international legal system. The right to exist, which finds expression in the
rights of self-preservation, freedom from existential genocide and selfdetermination, is a right that is attributed to nations regardless of whether
they constitute a State in the formal sense of that term. To claim otherwise
is to deny the natural law right its rightful significance. Natural law predates
the formation of our Westphalian system of States, and therefore some
rights existing under natural law must attach to entities that endure even in
the absence of the formal superstructure of State existence.
If we recognize that there exists a natural law doctrine of legitimate
defense, then some traditional elements of self-defense should fall by the
wayside. For example, the ICJ’s Nicaragua decision argued that outside
intervention on behalf of a victim required a formal request of assistance
from the beleaguered victim of unlawful aggression. 81 However, this
requirement was constructed from whole cloth; nothing regarding it
appears in the UN Charter. While it is clear that customary law prohibits
pretextual uses of force—using military assistance as a cover for colonizing
a victim of third-party aggression—there is no reason to think that a formal
request for assistance is required to engage in defense of others.82 Indeed, it
potentially creates perverse incentives and rewards bad behavior: if an
outside force completely destroys a State and its government before a
request for assistance can be tendered, then outside intervention is
disallowed simply because the victim does not retain the formal political
structure to issue it.
Indeed, the doctrine of legitimate defense entails that a formal request
for assistance is unnecessary because in some situations, the beleaguered
party might be a national group that has no formal political structure for
making requests of assistance. If we reject the idea that the only formal
entities capable of legitimate defense are States, then we must also reject
the equally State-centric view that some kind of formal political request is
81. Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S), 1986
I.C.J. 14, ¶ 199 (June 27) (“At all events, the Court finds that in customary international
law, whether of a general kind or that particular to the inter-American system, there is no
rule permitting the exercise of collective self-defence in the absence of a request by the
State which regards itself as the victim of an armed attack. The Court concludes that the
requirement of a request by the State which is the victim of the alleged attack is additional
to the requirement that such a State should have declared itself to have been attacked.”).
82. Indeed, concerns about pretextual claims are implicit in any scheme regarding the
use of force, though they are particularly acute in the context of humanitarian
intervention. For a discussion, see JOSHUA JAMES KASSNER, RWANDA AND THE MORAL
OBLIGATION OF HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION 159 (2013).
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required before outside parties can render their assistance. Indeed, it would
seem absurd to suggest that the Tutsis in Rwanda could not be defended
simply because they had no political structure to issue an official and de
jure request for assistance.
The doctrine of legitimate defense provides a more legally satisfying
foundation for humanitarian intervention than the responsibility to protect,
a legal doctrine that asserts that outside intervention is permissible to
protect civilian populations from widespread human rights disasters. 83 The
problem with the RTP doctrine is that it is mostly an exercise in wishful
thinking. Proponents of the doctrine argue that it was crafted by an
international commission, at the behest of the United Nations, after the
Kosovo intervention was widely viewed as both illegal under international
law and morally legitimate—a tension that required some sort of revision.
Either international law needed to be tweaked or the international
community needed to concede that international law was, stubbornly,
immoral.
The result was the RTP commission and its widely heralded report.84
Unfortunately, it is an exaggeration to give the commission the imprimatur
of the United Nations. The commission was a creature of the Canadian
government, not the United Nations, although its members were individuals
from around the world, and it had taken up the challenge noted by Kofi
Anan, then Secretary-General of the United Nations, to resolve the
humanitarian intervention paradox. What of the much-heralded “adoption”
of the RTP report by the General Assembly? That resolution simply urged
the Security Council to take action to protect civilian populations.85 The
83. For a general canvassing of relevant doctrines regarding intervention, see Mary
Ellen O’Connell, Historical Development and Legal Basis, in THE HANDBOOK OF
INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW 1, 9–10 (Dieter Fleck ed., 3d ed. 2013).
84. INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION ON INTERVENTION AND STATE SOVEREIGNTY,
THE RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT (2001).
85. 2005 World Summit Outcome, G.A. Res. 60/1, U.N. Doc. A/RES/60/1 (Sept.
16, 2005) ¶ 139 (“The international community, through the United Nations, also has the
responsibility to use appropriate diplomatic, humanitarian and other peaceful means, in
accordance with Chapters VI and VIII of the Charter, to help to protect populations from
genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity. In this context, we are
prepared to take collective action, in a timely and decisive manner, through the Security
Council, in accordance with the Charter, including Chapter VII, on a case-by-case basis
and in cooperation with relevant regional organizations as appropriate, should peaceful
means be inadequate and national authorities are manifestly failing to protect their
populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity. We
stress the need for the General Assembly to continue consideration of the responsibility to
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resolution said absolutely nothing about the most aggressive aspect of the
RTP doctrine: the alleged unilateral right of all nations to intervene
militarily to stop a crisis in the absence of Security Council authorization. In
fact, the resolution emphasized the need for action within the Security
Council framework. Indeed, the doctrine itself is fundamentally vague; it
includes the notion of unilateral intervention, but also the much thinner
notion that the international community has a diffuse duty to lessen the
impact of war that falls on innocent civilians. That fundamental ambiguity
to RTP—does it mean something trite or tectonic—has allowed the
doctrine to flourish because at each moment that someone endorses it no
one really knows which version is being supported.86
The bigger problem with the RTP doctrine, in its tectonic variation, is
that it represents an exception to the UN Charter that falls outside the scope
of its provisions on the use of force.87 This is a problem not just for RTP,
but for all arguments of humanitarian intervention that couch themselves
as exceptions to the Articles 2 and 51 framework. Even Cassese, writing in
his famous European Journal of International Law article regarding Kosovo in
1999, declared that humanitarian intervention might emerge, through
custom, as an exception to the general framework established by the UN
Charter that force is only permitted via a Security Council authorization or
Article 51.88 But what does it mean to call this general framework an
protect populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against
humanity and its implications, bearing in mind the principles of the Charter and
international law.”).
86. See, e.g., Ban Ki-Moon, U.N. Secretary-General, Remarks at Berlin Event
“Responsible Sovereignty: International Cooperation for a Changed World” (July 15,
2008), which are vague about whether RTP allows for unilateral intervention (“Properly
understood, RtoP is an ally of sovereignty, not an adversary. Strong States protect their
people, while weak ones are either unwilling or unable to do so. Protection was one of the
core purposes of the formation of States and the Westphalian system. By helping States
meet one of their core responsibilities, RtoP seeks to strengthen sovereignty, not weaken
it.”).
87. See Antonio Cassese, Ex Iniuria Ius Oritur: Are We Moving Towards International
Legitimation of Forcible Humanitarian Countermeasures in the World Community?, 10 EUROPEAN
JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 23 (1999).
88. Id. at 29 (“However, if one takes into account the premise of that forcible action
and the particular conditions surrounding it, the following contention may be warranted:
this particular instance of breach of international law may gradually lead to the
crystallization of a general rule of international law authorizing armed countermeasure for
the exclusive purpose or putting an end to large-scale atrocities amounting to crimes
against humanity and constituting a threat to the peace. Such a rule, should it eventually
evolve in the world community, would constitute an exception to the UN Charter system of
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exception? It sounds awfully like ignoring the Charter, or at the very least
trying to implicitly amend it without following the actual amendment
procedure laid down for altering the foundational document.89 And therein
lays the great difficulty with RTP and all other arguments for humanitarian
intervention that involve crafting exceptions to Article 51: they weaken the
Charter by suggesting that its provisions can be ignored when they are
inconvenient. They undermine international law and its use-of-force
framework because they craft ad hoc exceptions that run the risk that some
members of the international community will start doing the same thing
with the rest of the document as well. Weakening the basic structure of the
UN Charter is a dangerous business.
In contrast, the doctrine of legitimate defense works within the Charter
by recognizing the absolute centrality of Article 51 for governance of useof-force questions. It accomplishes this task by offering a subtle reading of
Article 51, carefully attuned to the natural law origins of defensive force
and the positive law incorporation and preservation of that right into the
text of Article 51. By working within the four corners of Article 51, the
doctrine of legitimate defense strengthens—rather than weakens—the
legitimacy of both Article 51 and the Charter as a whole.90 Granted, the
doctrine of legitimate defense represents a vanguard interpretation of
Article 51 out of step with current treatments of the issue in doctrinal
treatises,91 but in many ways it offers a hermeneutical approach more
carefully attuned to the text of Article 51 than other arguments regarding
the use of force. These other, allegedly more “standard,” interpretations
offer no explanation for why natural law should be excluded from the
scope of the analysis when it is so explicitly referenced in the text of Article
51.
The doctrine of legitimate defense is also preferable to using the
doctrine of necessity on which to ground humanitarian intervention.
collective enforcement based on the authorization of the Security Council. In other words,
it would amount to an exception similar to that laid down in Article 51 of the Charter
(self-defence).”).
89. See U.N. Charter art. 108 (“Amendments to the present Charter shall come into
force for all Members of the United Nations when they have been adopted by a vote of
two thirds of the members of the General Assembly and ratified in accordance with their
respective constitutional processes by two thirds of the Members of the United Nations,
including all the permanent members of the Security Council.”).
90. This point is also made in FLETCHER & OHLIN, supra note 27, at 134.
91. See, e.g., JAMES CRAWFORD, BROWNLIE’S PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL
LAW 750–70 (8th ed. 2012).
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Necessity is clearly a ground for excusing a State from responsibility for an
internationally wrongful act.92 Belgium pled necessity before the ICJ when
Yugoslavia (Serbia) sued Belgium for its participation in NATO-led
bombings of Serbian targets.93 Belgian counsel argued that the doctrine of
necessity permitted military intervention when necessary to stop
widespread human rights abuses and atrocities against innocent civilians.94
This implied a balancing approach: if the harm of intervention was
outweighed by the greater harm avoided, then the intervention could be
justified by necessity.95 Although the ICJ resolved the case on jurisdictional
grounds and never reached the merits, it is doubtful that the Court would
have accepted the argument. First, the necessity doctrine, on most
accounts, requires that the State in question act in fulfillment of essential
State interests, whereas in this case Belgium was acting to secure someone
else’s interests. So necessity protects a State acting for selfish reasons, but
not for altruistic or humanitarian reasons; therefore, it cannot serve as a
ground for humanitarian intervention. But even if this doctrinal
requirement were avoided, the greater problem with the doctrine of
necessity is again its weakening of the Article 51 framework. By working
from the outside, it suggests that Article 51 is subject to artificial and ad
hoc exceptions, rather than doing the more difficult work of offering an
interpretation that is internally consistent with the practice of humanitarian
intervention.
V.

APPLYING THE DOCTRINE OF LEGITIMATE DEFENSE

The next task is to apply the doctrine sketched out in the previous parts by
looking to concrete situations so as to identify the real impact of the
doctrine of legitimate defense. The most prominent case of humanitarian
intervention—the situation that arguably gave birth to the doctrine of the
responsibility to protect—was the NATO intervention against Serbia in
response to the civil war in the former Yugoslavia and, following that,
92. See Robert D. Sloane, On the Use and Abuse of Necessity in the Law of State
Responsibility, 106 AMERICAN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 447 (2012).
93. See Oral Pleadings of Belgium, Legality of Use of Force (Yugo. v. Belg.), 1999
I.C.J. Pleadings 15 (May 10, 1999), available at http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/10
5/4515.pdf (uncorrected translation).
94. Id.
95. Id. (“A state of necessity is the cause which justifies the violation of a binding rule
in order to safeguard, in face of grave and imminent peril, values which are higher than
those protected by the rule which has been breached.”).
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reports of ethnic cleansing in Kosovo. NATO forces bombed Serbia
multiple times, the first in 1995 after atrocities were committed in Bosnia,
and the second in 1999 after allegations of atrocities committed by proSerbian forces in Kosovo. The bombing led to the withdrawal of Serbian
forces from Kosovo, the introduction of United Nations peacekeepers into
the region, the creation of a semi-autonomous government for Kosovo
and eventually a unilateral claim of Kosovo independence. As discussed
above, the military intervention, though widely celebrated (outside of
Serbia), was not authorized by the Security Council and sparked collective
handwringing over the legitimacy of the UN framework regarding the use
of force. If the Charter prohibited NATO’s bombing campaign, and the
action was morally justified, what does this say about international law?
That international law is immoral? That is probably an exaggeration, but at
the very least the situation opened up the possibility of a substantial gap
between international law and morality.96
The anxiety is understandable, but ultimately resolvable. As I now
explain, the international law framework for the use of force, once properly
understood, allowed for the NATO intervention against Kosovo. It was
legal. And more importantly, it was legal according to Article 51. One need
not appeal to some extra-legal claim regarding morality, or new exceptions to
the Charter’s use-of-force regime. The seeds for justifying the Kosovo
operation lay within the words of Article 51 itself.
In the midst of a civil war, ethnic Albanian civilians in Kosovo were
attacked by military forces operating either under the de jure or de facto

96. See David Wippman, Kosovo and the Limits of International Law, 25 FORDHAM
INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL 129, 130–31 (2001) (“These distinctive characteristics of
the NATO intervention created an irresolvable tension between the formal law of the
U.N. Charter and the actual practice of States whose conduct is central to international
lawmaking. The breach of the Charter was clear and apparent. NATO did not seek or
receive Security Council authorization, and it was not acting in self-defense. For many
international lawyers, the analysis ends there. But simply labeling the intervention illegal is
unsatisfactory. The authority of international law rests on a reasonable congruence
between formally articulated norms and State behavior; when the two diverge too sharply,
the former must adapt or lose their relevance. The scope of the Kosovo operation, the
identity of the participants and the lack of a coherent legal rationale all combine to render
it difficult to dismiss the intervention as an anomaly with no lasting impact on
international law. But at the same time, the continuing disagreement within NATO and
among States generally over the legitimacy and desirability of unauthorized humanitarian
intervention make it difficult to discern any clear change or evolution in the law. The
result is a persistent and disquieting uncertainty.”).
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control of Serbia.97 The attacks targeted and killed not just Kosovo
Liberation Army rebel forces in Kosovo, but also civilians. The ethnic
Albanians of Kosovo are arguably a nation or people (Kosovars), or at the
very least part of the Albanian nation.98 Although this fact is a sociological
and ethnographic fact—as opposed to a legal fact—it is entirely plausible
that the Kosovars constitute an ethnic group that is protected by the law.
Indeed, they are protected by the law of genocide in the sense that an
attack against the ethnic Albanians in Kosovo designed to destroy their
group in whole or in part (performed with genocidal intent) would
constitute the crime of genocide.99 The group has the right to be free from
existential destruction and that right is codified in the Genocide
Convention.
The most controversial application of my claim is that the ethnic
Albanians had a right of legitimate defense once they were unlawfully
attacked by Serbian forces. There are several ways of expressing this legal
claim. First, one might put the point this way: the Kosovars constitute a
legally protected people who have not only the right of self-determination,
but also the more primary natural right to exist. When that right is
threatened because they are militarily attacked, they have the right—under
natural law—to exercise lawful self-defense on their own behalf. The fact
that the Kosovars did not enjoy international statehood is no reason for
denying them the right of self-defense. Statehood is a function of the
international legal system, and the natural right to self-defense would apply
even if there were no international legal system in operation. The natural
right of self-defense is logically independent of statehood. If the Kosovars
97. See Prosecutor v. Šainović et al., Case No. IT-05-87-A, Appeals Judgment (Int’l
Crim. Trib. for the former Yugoslavia Jan. 23, 2014) (affirming convictions but reducing
some sentences of Serbian officials responsible for Kosovo atrocities). For a discussion of
this decision (including its discussion of the “specific direction” standard for aiding and
abetting liability), see Marko Milanovic, The Self-Fragmentation of the ICTY Appeals Chamber,
EJIL: TALK! (Jan. 23, 2014), http://www.ejiltalk.org/the-self-fragmentation-of-the-ictyappeals-chamber/.
98. See Christopher J. Borgen, Kosovo’s Declaration of Independence: Self-Determination,
Secession and Recognition, ASIL INSIGHTS (Feb. 29, 2008), http://www.asil.org/insights/vol
ume/12/issue/2/kosovos-declaration-independence-self-determination-secession-and (“it
remains an open question whether widespread support of Kosovo’s independence would
signal a shift in the definition of ‘people’ so that the term no longer represents a complete
ethnic nation but can be used to refer to a homogenous ethnic enclave within another
nation”).
99. For a description of the conflict, see SAMANTHA POWER, A PROBLEM FROM
HELL: AMERICA AND THE AGE OF GENOCIDE 443 (2002).
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are attacked, they have the right to defend themselves to vindicate their
right to exist.
This is where the language of Article 51 comes into play. Because the
Kosovars have the right to defend themselves against an unjust and
unlawful attack, third-parties have the right to come to their aid through
the exercise of defense of others. The conditions for lawful defense of
others track the conditions for lawful self-defense. So if the Kosovars have
a right of self-defense against an unjust attack, then NATO was necessarily
permitted to intervene on their behalf. It is nonsensical to claim that
someone has a right of self-defense but no one has a corresponding right
to defend them. The two always go together.
Article 51 vindicates this analysis. Its bare terms carve-out the natural
right of légitime défense, a broader category of defensive force that includes
both self-defense and defense of others in one omnibus justification. So
NATO and its member States were permitted to engage in defensive force
on behalf of Kosovo just as long as Kosovo had a natural right to defend
itself. This is the essence of legitimate defense. Article 51 also imposes
other restrictions though they were clearly satisfied in the Kosovo
situation. The right of response is only triggered once an “attack” occurs.
In the Kosovo case an attack certainly did occur, and it was a vicious and
sustained one against the Kosovar people. Under natural law, the Kosovars
have the right to exist and third parties have a natural law right to exercise
legitimate defense on their behalf. NATO exercised that right. 100 The result
is that the existence of the Kosovar people was preserved.
Putting the same point in terms that would have been comprehensible
to the natural law theorists, every nation has a right of self-preservation.
The United States, Belgium and other members of NATO each have the
right to engage in self-preservation, and that right generates a
corresponding duty as well. Both the right and duty attach not just to the
bare fact of self-preservation in the existential sense, but also the right and
duty to perfect their preservation. The natural law theorists were explicit that
this generated a right of intervention, especially when other States were
100. See Steven Erlanger, NATO Was Closer to Ground War in Kosovo than is Widely
Realized, NEW YORK TIMES, Nov. 6, 1999, § 1, at 6, available at http://www.nytimes.com
/1999/11/07/world/nato-was-closer-to-ground-war-in-kosovo-than-is-widely-realized.ht
ml (noting that Tony Blair was preparing to officially activate thirty thousand British
reservists so as to send fifty thousand troops into battle in Kosovo). President Clinton was
also making preparations for a ground invasion with an additional one hundred twenty
thousand American troops. Id.
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being obstinate and failing to perfect their own right of preservation.101
This point naturally applies to the coordinated international intervention
against Serbia. As Lauterpacht and Oppenheim put the point, interventions
to perfect the right of preservation were justified to force a State to comply
with its international obligations.102 Since Serbian forces were violating
international obligations by systematically killing civilians and violating
other provisions of international humanitarian law and international human
rights law, the international community was justified under international
law in intervening in order to rectify this malfeasance.
One might object that some of these Serbian actions were not, strictly
speaking, violations of international law at the time that the natural law
theorists were writing. Neither international humanitarian law nor
international human rights law existed in their current manifestations,
though the laws and customs of war are of ancient vintage and certainly
existed (and were extensively discussed by the natural law theorists). The
idea that is so important to human rights law—that a sovereign’s treatment
of its own citizens is a matter of international concern—is a recent
development in the history of human rights and international law.103 The
modern-day “thinness” of sovereignty is a post-World War II
development.
There are two answers to this objection. First, the history is not entirely
accurate. Yes, the birth of human rights law after World War II ended a
period of strong sovereignty embodied in the Westphalian order.104
However, the story is not so simple. It is more accurate to say that
sovereignty has waxed and waned over the years, moving through periods
and phases where individual States received greater or lesser degrees of
insulation from outside “interference” and intervention. There was a time,
for example, when outside intervention from third States was more
common than it is now because the right to engage in warfare was not
completely restricted. Second, the exact nature of the international law
violations committed by the host States is irrelevant. The key point is that
the natural law theorists believed in a right of intervention, based on self101. See supra notes 38–45 and accompanying text (discussing Vattel).
102. See supra notes 50–54 and accompanying text.
103. See LOUIS HENKIN, THE AGE OF RIGHTS (1990).
104. For a discussion, see Benjamin N. Schiff, Universalism Meets Sovereignty at the
International Criminal Court, in NEGOTIATING SOVEREIGNTY AND HUMAN RIGHTS:
ACTORS AND ISSUES IN CONTEMPORARY HUMAN RIGHTS POLITICS 59 (Michaelene Cox
& Noha Shawki eds., 2009).
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preservation, to deal with recalcitrant States that refused to obey their
international obligations. The content of those international obligations is
mostly irrelevant for the argument. What matters is that natural law
recognized that right of intervention when necessary to perfect the right of
self-preservation, and the exact content of the international legal norms
violated by the offending State is not material to the right of intervention
triggered by their violation. The fact that Serbia violated human rights
norms that only crystallized after World War II should not matter to the
analysis.
Having considered a situation where the doctrine of legitimate defense
justifies intervention (Kosovo), we should now consider a baseline—a
realtime scenario where intervention is not justified by the doctrine. The
recent military excursions by Russia in Crimea and eastern Ukraine provide
an excellent example.
Russian troops covertly entered Crimea and, without wearing
identifying insignia, took control of key installations on the Ukrainiancontrolled territory.105 Presumably the Russians engaged in the pretext of
anonymity because they wanted to preserve the option of classifying the
deployed battalions as homegrown, Russian-speaking militias from Crimea
(rather than an outside military force).106 This strategy never came to
fruition because the world saw the troops for what they were—forces
dispatched by the Kremlin. Although the government of Ukraine—and
foreign powers—complained about the Russian annexation of Crimea, no
one was willing to go to war with Russia over the peninsula. Ukraine
eventually ceded de facto control over the territory to Russia.107
105. See Andrew Higgins, Amid More Signs of Russian Force in Crimea, Delight Mixes with
Dismay, NEW YORK TIMES, Mar. 2, 2014, at A15, available at http://www.nytimes.com
/2014/03/02/world/europe/tensions-rise-in-crimean-capital-as-armed-men-continue-totake-up-posts.html?_r=0.
106. Id. (“None of the heavily armed soldiers had insignia on their green combat
uniforms, and for days, Russia insisted that it was just a spectator to the dramatic events
unfolding in the Ukrainian region of Crimea and was as puzzled as everyone else by the
identities of masked gunmen who had seized Crimea’s two main airports and its
Parliament and main government office buildings.”).
107. See David M. Herszenhorn & Andrew E. Kramer, Ukraine Plans to Withdraw
Troops From Russia-Occupied Crimea, NEW YORK TIMES, Mar. 19, 2014, at A14, available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/03/20/world/europe/crimea.html
(“While
the
provisional government in Kiev has insisted that Russia’s annexation of Crimea is illegal
and has appealed to international supporters for help, the evacuation announcement by
the head of the national security council, Andriy Parubiy, effectively amounted to a
surrender of Crimea, at least from a military standpoint.”).
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Was the Russian intervention in Crimea an exercise of legitimate
defense? Arguably not, but not because of the usual reason, i.e., the
intervention came from an outside source. Rather, the doctrine of
legitimate defense fails to justify intervention in this case because the
Russian-speaking Crimean people were never attacked. They were not
subject to widespread or systematic human rights abuses, they were not
subject to crimes against humanity or other forms of ethnic cleansing, and
they were not victimized by an attempted genocide. Their right to existence
was never threatened and, consequently, their right of self-preservation,
and the need to use defensive force, was never triggered. Because the
Crimeans themselves had no right to use defensive force on their behalf,
there was no corresponding legitimate defense (defense of others) that
could be exercised by the Russian military forces from Moscow. Whether
the Crimeans had a right of self-determination that was not fulfilled by
their existing arrangement within Ukraine is a separate question and not
one that is properly addressed in this essay. It should be noted, however,
that although the Russian-speaking Crimeans arguably have a right of selfdetermination, their internal political arrangement with Ukraine permitted
them a strong amount of regional autonomy, such that it is probable that
their right of internal self-determination was protected before the Russian
annexation of their territory. A similar analysis applies to the Russianspeaking population of eastern Ukraine. Although this region of Ukraine
does not enjoy the regional autonomy that the local government of Crimea
enjoyed, it is nonetheless important to note that the ethnic Russians in
eastern Ukraine were neither attacked nor suffered an existential threat that
would have triggered a right of response—and a corresponding right of
intervention by third parties—under the doctrine of legitimate defense.
VI.

CONCLUSION

The doctrine of legitimate defense will inevitably be criticized from both
sides of the spectrum. Traditional advocates for robust restrictions on the
use of force will complain that it licenses too much intervention, potentially
destabilizing the world community,108 and that the doctrine could be cited
For a discussion of the tension between “balancers” and “bright-liners,” see
Matthew C. Waxman, Regulating Resort to Force: Form and Substance of the UN Charter Regime,
24 EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 151, 157 (2013) (“While giving broad
discretion to the UN Security Council—a process that although internally quite
unconstrained can yield clear directives—Bright-Liners generally argue that any use of
108
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as a pretext for military interventions that are motivated by ulterior
concerns. Also, legal positivists will complain that the doctrine strays from
the established reading of the text of Article 51 and is unmoored from
traditional sources of public international law because natural law is not an
acceptable source of law. On the other end of the spectrum, advocates for
humanitarian intervention will complain that the doctrine of legitimate
defense is too timid because it does not justify interventions in situations
(including humanitarian disasters) that do not involve military attacks or
existential threats that trigger the right of self-preservation. The answer to
both sides of the spectrum is exactly the same. The doctrine of legitimate
defense is not an example of wishful thinking; its content cannot be
dreamed up based on desire alone. Its content is provided by natural law
and the bare text of Article 51, which incorporates natural law by reference
and carves out its content from the Article 2 prohibition on the use of
force. Most importantly, the fact that the doctrine does not justify all
interventions is a virtue of the theory—not a vice. It would be better to
defend a legal doctrine that is justified by the current state of the law, and a
close reading of its foundational treaty and its relevant provisions, rather
than make up a panicky and expansive doctrine designed only to fill the
gaps of the current law identified by our moral intuition.

force beyond that authorized by the UN Security Council should be regulated by sharp
lines, or rules that admit very little discretionary balancing by individual states (whether
those contemplating or using force or those judging it).”).
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